Cognitive Dissonance: A Closer Look at the Spreading of Alternatives

Abstract

According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), choosing between two close alternatives can create discomfort because of the conflict involved in rejecting a desirable option (if the two choice options are desirable) or in choosing an undesirable option (if the choice options are both undesirable). According to dissonance theory, individuals try to reduce this discomfort by evaluating chosen options more favorably and/or evaluating unchosen options less favorably (a phenomenon known as “spreading of alternatives”). Traditional critiques by Bem (1967) and recent critiques by Chen and Risen (2010) have challenged the role of dissonance-based discomfort in post-choice spreading of alternatives. The current research attempts to address the critiques in two ways. First, showing a role for measured discomfort would help to make a case for dissonance. Second, previous work using an essay-writing paradigm has found dissonance effects to be stronger when the essay is counterattitudinal rather than proattitudinal. This suggests that spreading might be more driven by dissonance when choosing between two disliked rather than two liked options. Research participants evaluated a set of food items and were randomly assigned to make a choice between either two equally favorable options or two equally unfavorable options. Attitudes were measured before and after the choice, and the level of discomfort was also measured after the choice but before the post-choice ratings of the alternatives. Spreading was observed for choices between both positive and negative options. Also, as might be predicted from dissonance theory, spreading of positive alternatives was driven by shifts in evaluation of the rejected more than the chosen option. However, post-choice discomfort did not predict spreading. Results supporting dissonance theory and its alternative theories were found.